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Several of the ideas discussed here are developed at greater length in Suzanne B. 
Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and 
Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1955 (2006). Additional information 
regarding the status of the marriage and domestic partnership developments
 discussed here can be found in Suzanne B. Goldberg, And Justice For All? Litigation, 
Politics, and the State of Marriage Equality Today, 1 Advance 33 (Spring 2007).
Whether “separate but equal” rules violate American equality guarantees 
depends less on fi xed jurisprudential rules and more on prevailing social 
views than the popular invocations of Brown v. Board of Education would 
suggest. When it decided Brown in 1954, the Supreme Court pointed to 
“modern” psychological research to justify its conclusion that racial segre-
gation caused constitutional harm. It did not, contrary to the received wis-
dom, declare that the Equal Protection Clause, in and of itself, forbid states 
from separating their constituents by race. Instead, years would pass before 
the Court recognized explicitly that new norms regarding equality, as well as 
new social and psychological facts, underpinned its invalidation of offi cially 
sanctioned race-based distinctions.
 Since Brown, constitutional challenges to “separate but equal” rules have 
arisen in a variety of additional contexts, and courts have continued to look 
to “facts” and “modern research” about the separately treated group or issue 
to reach their decisions. As in Brown, the courts undertaking this fact-centered 
adjudication regularly leave unmentioned (at least in early decisions that 
forge new constitutional doctrine) the equality norms that inevitably shape 
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their view of the facts. In Reed v. Reed, for example, the Supreme Court in 
1971 treated women’s experience in administering estates as the reason for 
invalidating an estate law prioritizing husbands over wives. The Court neither 
responded directly to the Idaho high court’s observation that “nature itself” 
justifi ed the sex-based rule nor acknowledged the sex-equality norm that 
undergirded its fi rst-ever rejection of state-sanctioned sex discrimination.
 Today, one cutting-edge location for studying how social change may 
reshape “natural” differences into legally intolerable classifi cations is in the 
roiling confl ict over whether same-sex couples should be recognized via marriage 
or civil unions (or domestic partnerships, as the status is known in some 
states). As in the early race and sex discrimination cases, many courts (and elected 
offi cials) have studiously avoided addressing the implications of the “sepa-
rate but equal” relationship-recognition rules they are being asked to evaluate. 
 To be sure, most states provide no formal legal recognition at all for 
same-sex couples, and some have gone so far as to amend their constitutions 
to underscore the point. At the same time, however, a number of states have 
changed their relationship rules quickly and substantially. Although the current 
debate about the relative merits of marriage and civil union was all but unimag-
inable until 1993, when the Hawaii Supreme Court rejected the government’s 
motion to dismiss a marriage equality suit brought by gay and lesbian couples, 
all signs suggest that the rapid change will continue.
 For those states that have created civil union as a marriage-like status 
that provides the state-controlled benefi ts and obligations of marriage, the 
“separate but equal” question is front and center. And while constitutional 
equality doctrine has some role, changing societal views regarding both gay peo-
ple and marriage are unquestionably an equally if not more infl uential factor 
shaping the analysis of whether the distinction in relationship-recognition 
rules should be tolerated.
 At a time when the prevailing public view was that same- and different-
sex couples were fundamentally different, whether along functional, legal, 
moral, or other dimensions, the marriage/civil union question would not 
have been a diffi cult one. The different treatment could have been explained 
by pointing to differences between the couples, so long as those perceptions 
of difference were widely held. 
 Today, by contrast, many states and local governments forbid sexual-
orientation discrimination. In family law, in particular, jurisprudence in the 
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overwhelming majority of states holds that sexual orientation is, in itself, 
irrelevant to parenting ability, and that gay and non-gay parents are similarly 
situated in adjudications of parental rights. The nation’s leading social science 
experts are in accord, with the American Psychological Association and the 
American Academy of Pediatrics regularly weighing in to support equal 
treatment of gay and non-gay parents and adult couples. 
 Despite these changes in perception and the move toward equal treatment 
of gay and non-gay people generally, many courts have not “tipped” to the 
point of rejecting “separate but equal” relationship rules. Instead, several 
arguments have had signifi cant traction, both in court and in the public 
debate, to justify the different treatment. 
 For one, some courts have found that tradition authorizes states to exclude 
same-sex couples from marriage. After all, the argument goes, marriage has 
always been between a man and a woman. True enough, as a historical matter, 
but state marriage rules also, for many years, incorporated race-based dis-
tinctions and treated women as the property of their husbands. A second 
favored argument is that the legislature, not courts, should decide contested 
public questions, including those regarding the rights of same-sex couples. 
Apart from questions about whether an “avoidance of public debates” doc-
trine forms an actual part of equal protection law, we can note simply, for 
purposes here, that courts regularly decide diffi cult, politicized questions.
 A fi nal argument popular in some quarters is that states have committed 
no equality violation in reserving marriage for different-sex couples because 
society, not the state, has endowed marriage with its special social status. 
This, too, might carry weight if the state did not exercise monopolistic control 
over civil marriage. As is, though, the state wholly governs access to civil 
marriage and cannot, under ordinary rules, invoke either social biases or 
preferences as a legitimate justifi cation for unequal rules.
 While none of these leading rationales for “separate but equal” relation-
ship rules presents particularly strong legal arguments in light of contemporary 
constitutional doctrine, they have, as just noted, continued to hold sway in 
many jurisdictions. This phenomenon suggests the force of the observation at 
the outset of this essay—that judicial determinations about the permissibility 
of separate rules are more culturally contingent than we might ordinarily think.
 Although equal protection doctrine surely plays some role, the more 
powerful infl uence, it seems, is in societal perceptions of the groups and issue 
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at hand. As a descriptive matter, this tells us that shifts in equal protection 
analysis will typically occur fi rst with judicial pronouncements that “facts” 
have changed and only later with open declarations of new equality norms. 
As a predictive matter, this dynamic suggests that to determine the future of 
“separate but equal” rules, we cannot limit our analysis to rote invocations 
of Brown and must instead also, and always, look to the surrounding social 
context. 
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